Zen and Anakytical Philosophy by Ryan James A.
Zen and Analytic Philosophy
J ames A. Ryan
A n analytic philosopher might wonder about the philosophical relevance of Zen. But in attempting to read a little bit about Zen, 
the philosopher will probably find very few studies which go straight to 
the sorts of questions which occupy him. For in discussing Zen, most 
writings focus on its religious, literary and historical aspects.1 These 
studies sometimes touch upon philosophical aspects of Zen, but usually 
insofar as they are relevant to other aspects of Zen and not insofar as 
they are relevant to philosophy.
Another hindrance to Western philosophical understanding of Zen 
is the style in which most classic texts in Zen are written. The original 
source literature of Zen is filled with poetry and baffling stories (koans) 
written by monks whose principal aim was admittedly soteriological, 
rather than philosophical. Zen Buddhism certainly is a religion, since 
it involves ritual, soteriology, mysticism, sacred space and time, and 
the like. But it does attempt to answer the basic questions of analytic 
philosophy, particularly questions about metaphysics, questions about 
the ultimate reality or nature (benxing) of things and the mind, and 
questions of philosophical anthropology about the nature of the self 
and the good life. While Zen seems to be focussed on metaphysics, it
1 Notable exceptions include, of course, Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985); and Steven Heine's various works on 
Zen and Heidegger. However, these works focus more on Continental philosophy than 
on its relation to analytic philosophy, which is the scientific search for answers to ques­
tions of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.
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might also have implications for ethics and for the epistemological un­
derpinnings of Zen beliefs. Here I will attempt explain Zen with the 
terms of metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. This will be an infor­
mational discussion in comparative philosophy, rather than a position 
for or against Zen as a position in analytic philosophy. However, I will 
offer some points of evaluation along the way and in the conclusion.2
2 The work o f a philosopher is mainly to solve philosophical problems. But it is also 
to promote historical and cross-cultural philosophical understanding. The latter is the 
primary goal o f  this article.
3 D. T . Suzuki, “ The Buddhist Conception o f  Reality,*’ in Frederick Franck, ed.» 
The Buddha Eye: A n  Anthology o f  the K yoto  School (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 
pp. 92-93.
4 Masao Abe, “ God, Emptiness, and the True Self,** in Franck, The Buddha Eye, 
pp. 71-72.
5 Abe, in Franck, The Buddha Eye, p. 72.
Metaphysics
Zen accepts the Mahayana Buddhist position that things are “ empty”  
of objective properties. It is commonly said in Zen texts that the fun­
damental nature of things is empty (benxing kong). Here nature is close­
ly associated with causal characteristics. As the Zen scholar D. T. 
Suzuki explains, intellectual inquiry into the nature of things is mainly 
a search for their causal explanations.3 This is a reasonable construal 
of “ nature.”  Even in modem Western science, the nature of something 
is largely defined by its dispositional characteristics, its causes and its 
effects. However, Zen attempts to discover the fundamental nature of 
all things, of reality as such. This attempt to answer the broadest 
metaphysical question changes the nature of the inquiry. The contem­
porary Zen thinker Masao Abe explains that, in seeking the ultimate na­
ture of reality, Zen asks for the telos, the purpose, and not for a merely 
brute cause of existence.4  This view has been considered by other 
philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz). But the 
metaphysical answers in Zen arc unique. As Abe explains,5 according 
to Zen, the answer lies in questioner. The human mind gives sig­
nificance to existence (and thus, as I will explain, there is a certain 
idealist element in Zen). For, since existence, in to to, cannot have a 
cause, it cannot have an objective teleological cause. Any purpose of
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existence is derived from the mind. A particular conceptual scheme dis­
cerns in the teleologically indeterminate world one distinct structure or 
another. To see the world only in terms of one’s own peculiar concep­
tual scheme is to overlook the fact that the ultimate nature of reality is 
its emptiness of ultimate, mind-independent nature. An understanding 
of the emptiness of things is both metaphysical knowledge and a sense 
of a place in the world.
Metaphysical and philosophically anthropological (“ significance of 
existence”  or “ meaning of life” -type) questions are run together in 
Zen philosophy. I will attempt to keep the two as separate as possible. 
The metaphysical reasoning in Zen runs along the following lines. Ac­
cording to the Zen Buddhist position, things do not have an ultimate 
causal role. All causal roles are relative to the subjective imputation of 
a conceptual scheme. And only on a local, provisional level may a 
thing be described as being real, since only in some local conceptual 
scheme may it have a nature of any sort. Again, there is no ultimately 
objective conceptual scheme, since the world, existence itself, is pur­
poseless. This fact renders all things empty of inherent nature or reali­
ty, even though relative to a local conceptual scheme a particular thing 
may be said to be real.6 This is to say that a thing’s nature in itself, just 
as it is (zhenru), is emptiness. Anything which is conceptually accessi­
ble, or a possible object of cognition, is real only relative to that cog­
nition. As for the things in themselves, they are inaccessible to the 
intellect. To borrow an oddly non-trivial-sounding tautology from 
Hilary Putnam, “ You can’t describe the world without describing it.” 7 
The nature of a thing is thus always internal to a conceptual scheme. 
When it comes to the objective nature of things independent of any con­
ceptual scheme, it is inconceivable, which, according to Zen, is to say 
that it is empty.
6 This position is called the theory o f Two Truths in Mahayana Buddhism.
7 Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992).
The Zen way to understand things’ ultimate nature is therefore to un­
derstand them through a mental state which is not formulable in 
descriptions, except those which deny things’ reality. This state of sup­
posedly profound metaphysical knowledge involves a nonconceptual 
perception of things as devoid of inherent nature. According to Zen,
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we do not reach knowledge by argument alone. Rather, we reach it by 
casting off conceptual mental states. For these tend to be beliefs which 
assume that a certain narrow conceptual scheme is absolutely true of 
the world (and of the significance of our lives). An early Zen text, The 
Treatise on True Sudden Enlightenment, says,
Those who completely awaken know . . . that causal con­
nections produce events, and that temporary combinations 
produce events. Those who do not comprehend give rise to 
names and abide in words, grasp concepts and run around 
misguided.8
Here the Zen school endorses the metaphysics of the Huayan school, 
according to which a thing’s basic nature is inconceivable, since the 
causal connections to other things which determine its nature are 
infinite. Zen also endorses the metaphysics of the Chinese Yogacara (or 
Idealist) schools, according to which the mind, due to its attachment to 
a certain conceptual scheme, clings to certain aspects of things’ indeter­
minate and empty natures as though they were objectively real. Zen 
thus embraces the Yogacara view that all things are merely aspects of 
the mind.
This metaphysical idealism is common in the early texts (late 7th, ear­
ly 8th century) which were foundational to the Zen movement. As the 
Treatise on True Sudden Enlightenment says, ” . . . world is only 
mind.’*9 And “ [Identity] is born from false mind.” 10 Moreover, the 
most important text in early Zen was the Yogacara idealist sutra, the 
Lankavatara Sutra. The Zen School held to this point of view over 
the centuries. For example, the 13th century Japanese monk, DOgen, 
explains that the mind focuses on single characteristics, unable to see 
others. He gives the example of the ocean appearing round when one is 
at sea. Each thing actually has infinite, and thus indeterminate, quali­
ties. DOgen says, ” . . .  this ocean is not round, nor is it square—the
1 Treatise on The True Sudden Enlightenment School o f  the Great Vehicle which 
Opens up Mind and Reveals Reality-Nature, in J. C. Cleary, trans., Zen Dawn: Early 
Zen Texts from Tun Huang (Boston: Shambhala, 1991), p. 105.
’ Cleary, Zen Dawn, p. 105.
10 Cleary, Zen Dawn, p. 108.
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remaining qualities are inexhaustible.**11 Hence, he concludes, “All 
things, ultimately unfathomable, are flowers and fruits in the sky.*’12
11 DOgen, “GenjdkOan,” in J. C. Cleary, trans., ShObbgenzO: Zen Essays by DOgen 
(Honolulu: University o f Hawai'i Press, 1986), p. 34.
12 Ddgen, “ Kuge,”  in Cleary, ShObbgenzO, p. 72.
15 Philip B. Yampolsky, trans., The Platform Sutra o f  the Sixth Patriarch (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 137.
Unique to the Zen school is that it adopted this idealist point of view 
in a way which emphasizes nonconceptual meditation and the pro­
found and nonrational experience of enlightenment. Zen holds that 
it is not enough to believe that idealism is true. An unusual mental state 
is necessary, in order to grasp this basic metaphysical fact of things' 
inherently empty natures at a profound level. The indeterminate, infi­
nitely multifarious nature of things must be perceived, in order for 
metaphysical knowledge to obtain. This mental state was called by the 
legendary 7th century Zen monk, Huineng, nonthinking or no-thought 
(wunian)™ In this nondoxastic mental state one just sees the indescriba­
ble nature of one's own mind and of the world in a radically different 
way from normal categories.
Huineng is said to have witnessed two monks arguing over whether it 
is the flag or the wind that moves. Settling the matter, he is supposed to 
have said, “ It is the mind that moves.’’ This apparently illogical koan 
is probably meant to indicate something like the position developed by 
the 4th century A.D. Yogacara monk Vasubhandu. In his “ Thirty 
Verses’’ (Trimsika-karika) Vasubhandu suggests that there is a con­
stant shaping of experience by the mind. This shaping is “ pure” or 
“ mere” perception. It is very similar to the subconscious contribution 
which our brains make to perception and which contemporary cogni­
tive psychologists study. When the human mind, with its complex and 
often emotionally charged conceptual schemes, makes various discrimi­
nations in this pure perception, there then seem to be a self and the ob­
jects of the selfs conceptual scheme. These are “ mere consciousness” 
(weishi) and are not independently real. When the mind lets go of con­
ceptual schemes, the self and objects cease to appear as objects indepen­
dent of the mind. At this level of unadulterated, pure perception, one 
notices the fundamentally empty nature of things (including oneself),
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which has always been evident in the act of perception. It is as though 
Zen Buddhists claim that, after years of meditation, we can become 
conscious of the experience-shaping neurological states studied by cog­
nitive psychology! As DOgen says,
Life is like when one rides in a boat: though in this boat one 
works the sail, the rudder, and the pole, the boat carries one, 
and one is naught without the boat. Riding the boat, one even 
causes the boat to be a boat. One should meditate on this pre­
cise point. At this very moment, the boat is the world—even 
the sky, the water, and the shore all have become circum­
stances of the boat, unlike circumstances which are not the 
boat. For this reason life is our causing to live; it is life’s caus­
ing us to be ourselves. When riding in a boat, the mind and 
body, object and subject are all the working of the boat; the 
whole earth and all of space are both workings of the boat.
We that are life, life that is we, are the same way.14
The idea here is that there is nothing of any determinate nature outside 
of our conceptual schemes. We are always contributing our own con­
ceptual scheme to our perception of our environment. Enlightenment 
is the state of catching ourselves in the act and thereby seeing the real 
nature of things. Since enlightenment is therefore a mental state that is 
always potentially conscious, Zen monks emphasize that it is a simple 
shift in view, like a gestalt shift, only more profound.
As we have seen, in Zen, nature is identified with causal role. 
However, since there can be no purpose of being itself, according to 
the mechanistic assumptions upon which the intellect bases itself, the 
intellect is thus set up for inevitable disappointment. It must discover 
that being itself is not the sort of thing for which there could be an ob­
jective, extra-mental purpose.15 The explanation of reality itself, why it 
is and why it is in the way that it is, is not accessible to such inquiry, 
since there is nothing outside of reality to explain it. This is the Zen in­
terpretation of the First Noble Truth of Buddhism that “ life is dejec­
tion (suffering).” Our system of values is not reflected in the nature of
14 DOgen, “ Zenki,”  in Cleary, ShObOgenzO, pp. 45-46.
13 In Zen training this inevitable disappointment is supposed to be extremely frustrat­
ing, but it is also supposed to mark the imminence o f a breakthrough to enlightenment.
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things. Things, as they are separate from the mind, are indifferent to 
those values. And yet the turning point of enlightenment is supposedly 
available in this despairing thought. For there are no things separate 
from the mind. The notion that mind is a separate thing from the world 
is itself just another nonobjective conceptual scheme.,
In Western philosophy, various thinkers (Leibniz, Heidegger) have 
asked why there is anything at all. But the Zen school would agree with 
the admonition of the 7th century Huayan monk Fazang, who says 
that, in philosophers, “ emptiness sticks in the mind, always becomes a 
field of conditions. Though reality abides right before out eyes, it is 
turned into a realm of names and characterizations.” 16 Answering the 
question of the purpose of reality is closely associated with our own 
need for a sense of purpose and affirmation of our lives. The Bud­
dhist’s confrontation with the lack of a purpose which is both concep­
tually accessible and ultimately satisfactory forces him to reach a 
visceral17 and nonintellectual affirmation of human life. This has to do 
with how one feels about the opportunity to be conscious. If the lack 
of an external, objective or absolute purpose is not to throw one into 
dejection, one must reach a level of joy in the face of merely being, 
a bliss so profound that it outweighs the ultimate futility of ordinary 
human endeavors. This involves seeing one’s own nature as identified 
with an inconceivably creative and dynamic cause of all things as they 
are ordinarily perceived. This cause, according the Zen Buddhism is 
the very fact that things are empty, since things’ lack of determinate na­
ture enables them to appear in the variety of ways in which they do. 
But exactly why this explanation is satisfactory supposedly can be un­
derstood only by the enlightened.
16 Fazang, ‘ 'Cultivation o f  Contemplation o f  the Inner Meaning o f  the Hua-yen: 
The Ending o f  Delusion and Return to the Source.”  in J. C . Cleary, trans., Entry into 
the Inconceivable (Honolulu: University o f  Hawai'i Press, 1983), p. 150.
17 As a bizarre aside, I note that Japanese Zen monks have long emphasized the 
abdomen (hara) as the locus o f  the enlightenment experience, while contemporary 
biologists have called the intestines a “ second brain” since they contain an extremely 
complex brain-like neural system. See Sandra Blakeslee, “ Complex and hidden brain 
in the gut makes stomach aches and butterflies,”  New York Times, January 23, 1996.
Associated with this realization is the answer to the question, What 
is ultimate reality (zhenru)? Ultimate reality is emptiness, or “ mind 
only.”  These are the same, since the mind is the source of the various
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properties of things. Ultimate reality is just the causal chain itself. The 
ordinary mind in its deluded state can perceive only pieces of this 
chain. The mind tends to lose sight of their finitude and to reify them 
as if they were ultimate goals upon which the possibility of ultimate 
happiness or ultimate dejection hinges. When the mind rids itself of 
concepts, it supposedly sees the whole causal chain, as it were, in its in* 
describably and infinitely rich properties. Hence, the Buddhist dictum: 
Nirvana is samsara; ultimate bliss is not distinct from ultimate dejec­
tion. The nature of ultimate reality may make individual conceptual 
schemes and projects seem like insignificant grains of sand. And yet, ac­
cording to Zen, the realization that one’s own ultimate identity is void 
is the same as the realization that one’s own fundamental reality is not 
distinguishable from being itself.
Here is where we seem to slide from fundamental metaphysics to 
questions about the meaning of life and the nature of the self, ques­
tions of philosophical anthropology. This may be a point of philosophi­
cal criticism of Zen metaphysics. Zen seems to be starting with a nihilis­
tic, relativistic, or idealistic premise and then offering a psychology of 
adjustment to this putative fact. Thus it would seem to be a religious 
psychology rather than a metaphysical position. While there is some­
thing to this criticism, I will suggest later that it misses the mark.
In sum, Zen claims that things under their ordinary descriptions are 
fabrications of the mind, and that the actual nature of things is under­
stood only in a special nonconceptual mental state. Of course, ever 
since Hume and Kant blew the whistle, whenever bold metaphysical 
claims are made, epistemological questions arise. With Zen we want to 
know how to evaluate a claim to conceptually empty but supposedly 
momentous metaphysical knowledge, when that claim stipulates that it 
can have no argumentative support or even any content. The epistemo­
logical aspects of the metaphysical stance taken in Zen Buddhism will 
come up later. First, I will discuss moral aspects of Zen.
Ethics
Zen Buddhism was lambasted by Neo-Confucians of the Tang and 
Song Dynasties for its supposed antipathy toward morality. Zen Bud­
dhists recommended abandoning one’s filial and familial duties in or­
der to attain private salvation. Zen did not involve itself in social ills, but
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rather proclaimed their emptiness, along with the emptiness of moral 
values in general.
I will not attempt to rehabilitate Zen here. However, I would like to 
point out the possible ways in which Zen might be able to dispute the 
claim that it is at best irrelevant to ethics. The relevance of Zen for 
ethics may be described with the following line of inference. Consider 
the following propositions.
p: Absolutism about nonmoral values is true (i.e., any nonmoral 
value is an absolute value not relative to any conceptual scheme).
q: Nihilism about all conceivable purposes is true.
r: Conflicts between alternative value schemes ought to be treated as 
insoluble.
Now consider the following inference, which is implicit in Zen 
philosophy.
P if p then q
P2 if q then r
C Therefore, if p, then r.
Here “ nihilism”  in q is meant in the Nietzschean sense. This is the 
view that any purpose or system of value must be absolute. In other 
words, rather than being created by oneself, any real value must be 
uniquely and antecedently real, since only in that way can it really 
bestow significance on one’s otherwise purposeless life. This is nihilis­
tic, because it entails acceptance of the notion that there is no purpose, 
significance or worth to be had outside of an absolute conceptual 
scheme. For if it turns out, as Zen holds, that all value schemes are emp­
ty of objective reality, then, given that p, there is no worth in the world 
whatsoever. This is to say that, if one clings to some scheme of non- 
moral values,18 then one is a nihilist in the Nietzchean sense of someone 
who must cling to an absolute scheme of nonmoral values, or else 
despair. If one is a nihilist, then one is prepared to treat as insoluble all 
those moral conflicts which arise with others who subscribe to alterna­
tive nonmoral values. This is to believe that one ought to fight for one’s
II By “ nonmoral values" I mean goods other than moral goods. For instance, happi­
ness and beauty are nonmoral values, while the wrongness o f  murder and the rightness 
of returning stolen property arc moral values.
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way of life and impose it upon others. For on this view, to believe that 
one’s own way of life (one’s nonmoral values) is a mere choice, rather 
than the uniquely absolute nonmoral values, is to despair. With this 
much at stake, sometimes moral values are nihilistically overlooked by 
those who cling to nonmoral values. Hence, conclusion C: absolutism 
about nonmoral values entails that moral conflicts between people of 
differing ways of life should be treated as insoluble.
Now r is clearly unacceptable to any philosopher in a culturally 
pluralistic society. It spells the end of rational resolution of conflicts in 
and amongst societies. Zen undermines r by holding that p is false, al­
beit by claiming that a real understanding of the significance of “ p is 
false”  may be had only through meditative discipline. Denying that p 
and accepting nonabsolutism about nonmoral values may seem to ab­
solutists to be equivalent to nihilism. After all, if nothing is inherently 
valuable, despair seems warranted. But Zen, in arguing for C, claims 
just the contrary. Nonabsolutism (plus a disciplined mental clarity) is 
the way out of the despair of interminable social conflict. Recall that ac­
cording to the Zen position, the intellect cannot reach enlightenment, 
because it cannot in principle discover any absolutely true conceptual 
or valuational scheme. It is here that a nonintellectual insight steps in. 
As Suzuki says,
When the intellect comes to an impasse—to which it will sure­
ly come one day if it works honestly—it sees itself reflected in 
the mirror of faith, which is its homecoming. The intellect 
thus finally arrives at the great affirmation.19
The solution to the metaphysical problem supposedly brings with it 
profound psychological solace. Again we see Zen bringing together the 
concern we have for the “ meaning of life” and the concern we have to 
answer basic metaphysical questions. Also, we see here the close rela­
tion to be drawn between the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical 
claims entailed by Zen Buddhism.
In Zen, one comes to have a realization at a visceral level—and not 
merely the superficially verbal level—that our nonmoral values are not 
absolute. One no longer “ clings”  to them, i.e., no longer takes their 
being absolute and subject-independent to be necessary for one’s happi-
19 Suzuki, in Franck, The Buddha Eye, p. 95.
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ness. This means that one ought to have a set of desires without treat­
ing any of them or even the whole set, as absolutely indispensable. 
That is why Zen enlightenment is a gut realization, more than a verbal 
acceptance of the fact that there are no absolute purposes. Fazang even 
argues that enlightenment about emptiness requires one to be moral. 
For immorality entails egoism, which is one form of ignorance and 
stain obscuring our view of reality.20
Now, is this psychology, instead of philosophy? Not entirely. First, 
it is a pluralistic antidote to conflict. It is a normative social stance. Sec­
ond, it promotes shared experiences, in an affirmation of life and being 
itself, upon which partisans of all types should agree. It gives insight 
into the legitimacy of others’ endeavors, since one sees that being itself 
is value-neutral, open to human improvisation. These points are con­
ducive to philosophical values (truth, respect for people, democracy, 
etc.).
Any society experiences divisions over nonmoral values. They inhibit 
efforts to resolve conflicts of moral values. For they are sometimes 
zealously championed at the expense of moral values. An appreciation 
of mere being is a normative stance regarding how those conflicts 
should, in general, be handled. One might object that many people 
who have not experienced Zen enlightenment are pluralists about non- 
moral values and attempt to solve moral conflicts in a pluralistic way. 
They have reached an acceptance of the nonabsoluteness of nonmoral 
values on intellectual grounds and do not seem to need a visceral Zen 
enlightenment. This objection might show that Zen is more psychology 
than philosophy. A Zen Buddhist might respond that without the radi­
cally tranformative enlightenment about the inherent worth of being, 
pluralism reduces to a lifeless sort of relativism in which others’ ways 
of life are not actually affirmed but merely despairingly tolerated. One 
might object that it is precisely people whose nonmoral values leave a 
sour taste in our mouths, people whose existence we cannot enthusiasti­
cally affirm whom morality requires us to tolerate and respect. The Zen 
thinker might reply that, if the enthusiastically affirmative nature of 
respect for others is stripped away, then there is more resentment than 
respect left in one’s morality. However, I will not pursue these matters 
further here.
20 Fazang, in Cleary, Entry into the Inconceivable, p. 159.
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Epistemology
Zen claims that an insight into the basic nature of things is possible, 
just as a gestalt shift is an immediately available, but often difficult to 
obtain, change in perception. To see one’s conceptual schemes as 
nonultimate is a difficult mental trick. The point here is that one needs 
to achieve this new way of seeing, since it is not enough to believe that 
things are empty. An experiential understanding of emptiness is need­
ed, in order for this belief to be given content. The richer content is pos­
sible only after meditation, since it is ineffable and cannot be communi­
cated.
However, private justification is deeply problematic. We usually 
count as knowers only those who can provide reasons for their beliefs. 
Some philosophers of religion assert that it is possible for someone 
simply to see, without being able to give reasons, that the suffering in 
the world is logically reconcilable with the perfect goodness of an all- 
powerful and all-knowing god. Thus, the argument from evil against 
the existence of God is supposed to have a defeater in the private, 
basic knowledge and testimony of religious experiences. This may be a 
plausible defense of the epistemic status of religious experience. After 
all, mutes, unable to communicate their private knowledge, can have 
private, incommunicable justification.21 The problem is that here 
philosophy ends, and religion begins. For when we are asked to accept 
a position for which no evidence may be demanded, we do not have 
any reason to believe that position or to hold our own evidence against 
that position to be suspect.22
21 Zenkei Shibayama makes this point in Zen Comments on the Mumonkan (New 
York: American Library, 1975).
22 Other philosophers might disagree. (See Ralph W. Clark, “ The evidential value 
o f religious experience,” International Journal fo r  Philosophy o f  Religion 16 1984: 
189-202.) This issue is, o f  course, well-treated in the literature and lies beyond the 
scope o f  this paper. See Evan Fales, “ Mystical experience as evidence,” International 
Journal fo r  Philosophy o f  Religion 40 (1996): 19-46; and William Alston, Perceiving 
God: The Epistemology o f  Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991).
By the same token, Zen, too, takes away what it gives. The 
philosophy in Zen is primarily metaphysical. But we are lead ultimately 
to the necessity of a religious experience, and here Zen parts hands with
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philosophy. However, we should not break the link too quickly. 
Rather than taking a leap of faith away from philosophy, Zen offers a 
metaphysical argument in support o f the necessity of the enlightenment 
experience to metaphysical knowledge. As DOgen says,
Just because [the teachings of the Buddha and Zen adepts] 
are not rationally understood by you, that doesn’t mean you 
shouldn’t  study the road of rational understanding of the 
Buddhas and Zen adepts. Even if it should be ultimately 
without rational understanding, the rational understanding 
you are voicing now cannot reach it. . . . [The notion that 
Zen is totally without rational guidance or understanding is a] 
false idea of [the concept of] “ no rational understanding.” 
Who taught you this? Even if there is no teacher of natural 
reality, this is the heretical view. . .
Zen gives arguments about why and how an enlightenment experience 
opens the door to metaphysical knowledge. This is one reason why the 
we should not, as far as epistemology is concerned, classify Zen strictly 
as a religion. Another reason why we should not do so is that Zen pur­
ports, albeit in a mystical way, to be empirically based. Zen promises a 
mere gestalt-shift-type experience which, while in a sense radical, is in 
another important sense not radical, since not otherworldly or associ­
ated with any transcendence o f the world which we ordinarily perceive.
Recall the argument intended to show that an enlightenment of the 
Zen type is necessary to fundamental metaphysical knowledge. There 
we were told that the fundamental nature of reality can be accessed 
only by a mind free from conceptual discriminations, since the fun­
damental nature of reality, as shared by all things, is empty o f any de­
terminate set o f properties. Zen argues that the mind must understand 
its own nature as identical with the fundamental nature o f all things, 
since it is the subject in dependence upon which things are made to 
have misleadingly determinate-seeming and absolute-seeming proper­
ties. These are the philosophical arguments. On the other hand, 
Zen embodies the unavoidably nonphilosophical, nonconceptual enlighten­
ment experience. It is supposed to have significance, and yet it is not 
formulable in concepts or language. Therefore, the enlightenment ex-
23 DOgen, "SansuikyO,”  in Cleary, ShObOgenzO, pp. 92-93.
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perience cannot be considered public evidence, the kind of evidence to 
which philosophy must limit itself.
Conclusion
I cannot give a complete evaluation of Zen philosophy here. However, 
the following observations should be made. We have seen that, accord­
ing to Zen, the most important work in metaphysics cannot be under­
taken by philosophical reasoning. The 20th century Japanese monk 
Kobori Sohaku Nanrei says,
Remember that “ rose” is merely a name we give to an un­
fathomable substance according to our conceptual usage. . . . 
Whenever that which is anonymous is brought into the light 
of intellection, its original nature and substance is metamor­
phized and takes on quite a different character.24
We have always been using concepts, and this habit is said to require 
years of meditation in order to be broken. However, the enlightenment 
experience is supposed to be a profound insight into the basic nature of 
everything. If one can manage to stop clinging to conceptual schemes, 
one is supposed to be able to see that, as Kobori says, “ There is only 
chaos, the undifferentiated fact that ever renews its flowing.” 25
In a sense, Zen thinkers offer this up as an empirical claim. Huineng 
supposedly held that the matter was analogous to the direct knowledge 
of how hot or cold a glass of water is while one is sipping it, as com­
pared with the ignorance of someone who has not touched it. How­
ever, one might become suspicious when a mystical sect is made out 
to be empiricistic. The problem is this. Whether knowledge can be had 
through a private, ineffable insight is not necessarily a strongly em­
pirical claim. The putatively empirical claim, K, is, “ If you look and 
see for yourself, you’ll see that Zen enlightenment is knowledge.” Yet 
K itself may rather be a matter for general epistemological deliberation 
of the ordinary philosophical sort, rather than for having a look see in 
the strongly empirical sense. This is to say that K might be logically 
false, given our concepts of epistemic justification and knowledge. We
24 Sohaku Nanrei Kobori, “ A  Dialogue: A Discussion between One and Z ero /’ in 
Franck, The Buddha Eye, p. 141.
23 Kobori, in Franck, The Buddha Eye, p. 142.
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might be able to determine on independent epistemological grounds 
and without “ taking a look,” that taking a look might not, in princi­
ple, suffice to validate Zen enlightenment or K. Whether K is logically 
false cannot be settled here. But I think that ordinary epistemological 
deliberation would find that the concept of being justified without the 
ability to present that justification in concepts to someone, even to one­
self, is as close to a logical contradiction as anything is. This would cast 
serious doubt upon the notion that Zen metaphysics is empirically 
verifiable.
Nevertheless, while the claim to knowledge in Zen would not fare 
well in philosophical debate, it is still a philosophical claim which is 
part of a philosophical position. And it is quite an interesting position, 
in which the necessity of mystical insight to philosophical under­
standing is supported by a philosophical argument. It is an epistemo­
logical argument in favor of a claim to which epistemology is not 
supposed to be friendly. The argument fails, I think. However, it 
represents a way in which Zen involves itself deeply with philosophy 
and yet, perennially and in quite a fascinating manner, brings up 
idiosyncratic restrictions on the role which philosophy should play in 
thought.
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